














ert	Steel	argue	 that	 it’s	possible	 to	motivate	an	alternative	picture—the	Best-










































































































procedure,	 our	 opinions	 concerning	 how	 successful	 we	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 at	 following	 it’	
(Schoenfield	 [2018],	 p.	 711).	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 Best-Plan-to-Make	 picture,	 according	 to	















































































































extreme	way.	We	might,	 for	 instance,	 consider	 agents	who	 are	 reasonable	 in	 expecting	
themselves	to	be	perfect	calculators	only	up	to	a	certain	degree	of	complexity,	so	that	there	












































































12	 In	 fact,	 the	only	single-agent	decision	problems	 in	which	randomization	can	be	of	any	help	are	




𝑟!, 𝑟", …	, 𝑟#—can	be	characterized	in	terms	of	the	expected	accuracies	of	conforming	to	each	
of	those	deterministic	rules,	as	follows:	
	









(other	 than	 the	 degenerate	 one	 that	 assigns	 probability	 1	 to	 𝑟)	 such	 that	 𝐸𝐴$%(𝑝) ≥
𝐸𝐴$%(𝑟)?	No:	in	so	far	as	𝑝	assigns	any	nonzero	probability	to	a	rule	other	than	𝑟,	it	gives	
weight	to	some	𝑟& ∈ 𝐶	such	that	𝐸𝐴$%(𝑟&) < 𝐸𝐴$%(𝑟),	and	so,	since	there	can	be	no	compen-


























































































This	brings	us	 to	our	crucial	observation:	given	 the	separability	of	choice	of	 idealization	
from	choice	of	bridge	principle,	the	correct	way	to	determine	what	difference	our	choice	of	
bridge	 principle	 makes	 to	 our	 overall	 account	 of	 rationality	 is	 to	 consider	 what	 would	
change	were	we	to	replace	one	of	these	principles	with	the	other	while	holding	our	choice	























































































































in	 fact	 conform	 to	 some	other	deterministic	 rule	 𝑟".	 Then	her	 expectation	 can	be	 repre-
sented	as	the	expectation	that	she’ll	conform	to	𝑟′′,	where	this	is	a	probabilistic	rule	such	











































genuine	alternative	to	𝑟,	and	second,	 is	such	that	𝐸𝐴*$%(𝑟′) ≥ 𝐸𝐴*$%(𝑟).	Then	there’s	some	
rule	that’s	the	rule	to	which	the	relevant	agent	expects	she’ll	actually	conform	on	planning	
to	conform	to	𝑟′—call	this	rule	𝑟′′.	By	Equation	2,	𝐸𝐴*$%(𝑟′) = 𝐸𝐴$%(𝑟′′).	And	since	𝑟	is	avail-
able,	we	know,	by	Equation	1,	that	𝐸𝐴$%(𝑟) = 𝐸𝐴*$%(𝑟).	So	𝐸𝐴$%(𝑟′′) ≥ 𝐸𝐴$%(𝑟).	
	 Furthermore,	since	𝑟′	presents	a	genuine	alternative	 to	𝑟,	 the	agent	does	not	expect	
planning	to	conform	to	𝑟′	to	result	in	actually	conforming	to	𝑟.	That	is,	𝑟′′ ≠ 𝑟.	In	addition,	
Expected	Plan	Availability	guarantees	that	𝑟′′	is	available.	So	𝑟′′	is	an	available	rule	other	















can	 never	make	 a	 difference	 to	what	 rule	 an	 account	 recommends,	 why	 is	 it	 that	 both	
Schoenfield	 and	 Steel	 think	 it	 can	 make	 a	 difference?	 And	 second,	 if	 the	 problem	with	
Greaves	and	Wallace’s	argument	for	conditionalization	isn’t	that	it	presupposes	the	Best-










































choose	 to	 idealize.	And	 it’s	clear	enough	 that,	on	a	wide	range	of	choices	of	 idealization,	

























on	 how	 and	 to	what	 degree	 the	 relevant	 agent	 is	 idealized.	 It’s	 clear	 enough,	 then,	 that	
Greaves	and	Wallace’s	choice	of	 idealization,	not	their	choice	of	bridge	principle,	 is	what	
determines	 the	 particular	 verdicts	 delivered	 by	 their	 picture.	 (The	 connection	 between	
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